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enormous effect on the local economy of the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania region. Local estimates of wages lost as a result of the accident ranged from $5.7 million to $8.2 million in manufacturing, and from $2.8 million to $3.8 million in the nonmanufacturing sector. An estimated $6 million to $8 million were lost in revenues partly due to the decline in tourism. Losses in the agricultural sector were about $1 million. As some 34,000 people left the area, 256,000 person-days were lost. Of these, 15,000 lost pay as well (Flynn, 1979) . Orders for new nuclear plants had been declining for several years and the accident provoked a rash of further cancellations. Sixteen reactor orders in other parts of the country were withdrawn. Utilities in Ohio and Pennsylvania scrapped their plans for 4 nuclear plants despite an existing investment of $250 million.
Large-scale technological projects raise major questions of social equity. Given very long lead times, who should pay for construction costs? Are consumers today to pay for installations that will produce electricity for residents 15 years hence? The Three Mile Island accident also raised the issue of consumer liability in the case of accident. According to the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island (the Kemeny Commission), the cleanup, including emergency management and replacement of power, will cost from $1 billion to $2 billion (President's Commission, 1979). Some estimates, including the cost of building a new nuclear plant on the site, were as high as $3 billion (Technical Assessment Task Force, 1979). General Public Utilities Corporation (GPU), the holding company owning the Three Mile Island reactors, is deeply in debt and faces possible bankruptcy. Between January 1979 and January 1980, its net income dropped 51 percent and its liabilities increased 44 percent. It tried to pass costs on to consumers and won some emergency rate increases, but consumer pressure successfully limited this possibility. The increases as of March 1980 provided $150 million, and disputes continue over whether consumers or stockholders should foot the bill. Because these utilities employ 11,000 workers and control the supply of electricity in Pennsylvania and New Jersey (GPU owns Metropolitan Edison, Pennsylvania Electric Company and Jersey Central Power and Light Company), a bankruptcy could have disastrous consequences.
High capital investment encourages industrial commitment to existing technological systems, and limits the flexibility that may be necessary to adapt to safety requirements. The manufacturer of the Three Mile Island reactor, Babcock and Wilcox, had been warned of equipment problems. The pilot operator relief valve had failed at least 9 times prior to the accident. An earlier accident at a reactor in Toledo, Ohio had revealed several design problems, but the company failed to modify its technology to accommodate them. The nuclear industry is perpetually faced with accusations of falsifying records and disregarding regulations.' Given the high costs of construction and repair, financial penalties may be easier to absorb than the cost of major structural modifications in a nuclear facility. Indeed, the nuclear industry and its investors argue that required safety modifications have increased the cost of nuclear power to the point where new plants are financially "unattractive" to investors (Hebert, 1980) . Complexity. The complexity of a nuclear power plant, both in technological and organizational terms, and the interdependence of organizational and technical systems, contributed to the awesome difficulty of coping with the Three Mile Island accident.' The sophisticated organizational requirements of a nuclear power installation-the skills required to operate it, the organization of a managerial infrastructure, and the establishment of means of control-pose staggering problems of administration beyond the expertise and managerial capacity of most utilities. In this sense, the problems of Metropolitan Edison (the subsidiary of GPU licensed to manage the Three Mile Island reactor) were hardly surprising. The accident demonstrated the convoluted interrelationships between technical and human factors in the operation of technological systems and how this relationship reduces the predictability of risks and increases vulnerability. It suggested the difficulty of anticipating complications that include both operating errors and equipment failures, and of controlling breakdowns that ramify, often unpredictably, throughout a system. During normal operations a reactor is run with the assistance of a computerized instrument and control system. Computerization is necessary to make rapid adjustments to changes in the reactor's equilibrium. The Babcock and Wilcox reactor model is especially dependent on the use of an automatic computer system because its sensitive design requires split-second reactions to small changes. 
1980).
At the Three Mile Island reactor, the control room had been designed so as to be useful during normal operations but not necessarily in a crisis. One hundred alarms went off in the first few minutes of the crisis. There was no way for operators to sort out the signals. When reliance on the technical systems failed, the operators were inadequately prepared to deal with the emergency. Some blame the limitations of training which focuses principally on normal operating requirements. Others wonder whether the demands on an operator during a crisis are within the range of human capability. It has been argued that accidents are, in fact, "normal," that is, intrinsic to complex, interdependent systems. To the extent that this argument holds, it warrants special concern, given the dangers that could result from a nuclear accident (LaPorte, 1980; Perrow, 1980 (Fischoff, 1979) .
Similarly, efforts to predict the long-term effect of low-level radiation are obstructed by disagreement about the level at which radiation presents significant risks, and by inherent difficulties in sorting out its effects from other environmental insults. Here disputes among scientists have complicated the establishment of radiation standards for occupational safety.
The reaction of experts from federal and state agencies, industry, and anti-nuclear groups to the Three Mile Island accident illustrated the uncertainties about the risks of nuclear power and revealed how such uncertainty can be manipulated to serve particular ends (Nelkin, 1980) . The early estimates of radiation released by the accident varied widely. On March 29, immediately following the accident, the utility detected 7 millirems of radiation, but the NRC estimated around 20 millirems, claiming that a person near the plant could have received as much as 100 millirems. In late April, the NRC reported that the radiation levels within a 5-mile radius were near normal, but on the same day a report from the airport three miles away reported radiation levels 10 times normal. A chemist from the anti-nuclear movement made an independent inquiry and found on April 11, that radiation was 5 times the normal level at a site 20 miles from the plant, and on April 16, it was 50 times normal at a site 30 miles from the plant.
Consistent measurement is important as a basis for estimating the seriousness of exposure to radiation. The variation in these reports allowed a selection of data that could support any interpretation. The very language used to describe the accident revealed the very diverse percceptions that enter such interpretations. Was it an accident or an incident? A catastrophe or a mishap? A disaster or an event? A technical failure or a simple mechanical breakdown? Utility officials talked of "miniscule" hazards, comparing the dosage to dental X-rays. Critics talked of cancer and of "the grim reality of death." Harold Denton, the chief of operations for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), reassured the public that the radiation emission was "slight" and that sampling of milk, food, and water showed "negligible contamination. " There was "no cause for alarm. " At the same time, he urged pregnant women and children to evacuate the area and saw to it that potassium iodide, an antidote that blocks the accumulation of radioactive iodide in the thyroid, was on site.
Evaluation inevitably turned to a body count. In May, HEW Secretary Joseph Califano asserted that 1 to 10 additional cancer deaths (depending on controversial assumptions about the effect of low-level radiation) could be expected among the people living within 50 miles of the accident. An inter-agency task group estimated that the potential lifetime impact of the accident would be less than 2 fatal cancers and 2 non-fatal cancers among those living within 50 miles of the site.
Others estimated 20 additional cases of cancer, about half of them likely to be fatal, and one doctor predicted 50 additional deaths. Eventually, the task force studying radiation health for the Kemeny Commission concluded that the accident had a negligible health impact (President's Commission, 1979). However, locally in the Harrisburg area, where several long-term health studies are under way, debates continue over statistics. While most studies deny significant health effects, some claim increased infant morality and hyperthyroidism, and a dramatic array of health problems among domestic animals. The major finding of the Kemeny Commission, however, was the important psychological stress on the local population. Studies of the behavioral effects of the accident found the major short-term health impact to be psychological stress and demoralization among those living near the plant and faced with continued uncertainty about their fate (Dohrenwend, 1980) . Those who actually worked at Three Mile Island were the most demoralized and mistrustful people in the area, worried both about their health and about losing their jobs should the reactor close (Chisolm, 1980; Logan and Nelkin, 1980) . But even in the larger community, psychiatrists reported severe demoralization and mental health problems.4 These problems faded with time, but anger and distrust remained, exacerbated by the uncertainties over the logistics of the cleanup operation. Civic leaders have warned of violence if the utility were to vent Krypton gas from the crippled reactor-violence from a generally law-abiding and conservative population that prior to the accident had few negative feelings about nuclear power at all. The mayor of Middletown, Pennsylvania jokingly proposed that the banks add a radiation count to their displayed time and temperature clocks, but then observed, "I'm quite sure they'll never tell us the truth about the venting" (Reid, 1980) . A telephone survey of area residents found that most people believed they were given misleading information by the utility and the NRC. Meanwhile, a local pronuclear group has formed to protest the public image that the town is in a state of hysteria (Flynn, 1980) . The issue has thus polarized the communities near Three Mile Island with profound effects on social relationships.
Other unexpected risks were associated with this accident. The general difficulty of keeping track of plutonium is a problem of increasing concern in the regulation of nuclear power. Safeguards, claimed investigators from the General Accounting Office (GAO), are inadequate. Neither existing accounting systems nor physical security arrangements can prevent sabotage or the diversion of fissionable materials (GAO, 1980 Considerable data have been collected on public attitudes towards nuclear power and on the changes in attitudes as a consequence of accidents. Relatively little work has focused on the occupational and social class correlates of such attitudes. What is the effect of confusion and uncertainty on public views toward nuclear power? What in fact is the source of persistent and often profound skepticism about this technology? Is it simply the fear of risk, or as some would claim, the apocalyptic image that links this technology to nuclear war (Lifton, 1979 (Mitchell, 1980) . In this context of growing mistrust about nuclear power, the accident affected the role and responsibility of a number of institutions. The nuclear industry, public officials, the regulatory system, the courts, the scientific community and the media were all involved.
The Nuclear Industry. For the nuclear industry, the future of a $100 billion investment at stake, the Three Mile Island accident presented a serious problem of public image. Thus the industry proceeded with a massive effort to assure the public that nuclear power is a safe and controllable technology. Industry representatives talked of their ''energy awareness programs" and their "truth squads" (Starr, 1980) . The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), a consortium of utilities, set up a Nuclear Safety Analysis Center to study the Three Mile Island acident and to persuade the public that nuclear power is safe and necessary. Its estimated annual budget is $8 million. The industry also set up the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations to improve reactor operating standards and to monitor utilities to assure compliance to these standards. With 200 professionals, its budget is about $11 million.
The accident stimulated a number of proposals to restructure the industry. These ranged from a single national nuclear utility, to a set of nuclear corporations-all designed to reduce the fragmentation that exists at present. Alvin Weinberg has proposed a "moratorium" The Kemeny Commission investigation was only one of six major inquiries that were initiated as public officials at various governmental levels faced the implications of the accident. The NRC, the Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation, and the Energy and Environmental Subcommittees of the House Interior Committee each formed special inquiry groups. In addition, the governor of Pennsylvania formed a special commission and the utilities organized a Nuclear Safety Analysis Center. Beyond these major investigations, more specialized studies were sponsored by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Center for Disease Control, the Food and Drug Administration, the National Cancer Institute, and a variety of local and state government agencies. The confusion among government agencies with overlapping spheres of influence was apparent as all these groups sought to deal with the emergency and later to establish blame. The organization of the regulatory system was clearly a major problem.
The Regulatory System. The scale and complexity of a technological facility is matched by the size and complexity of the regulatory apparatus required to control it. Technologies of scale can blur the distinction between public and private interests. Given the size of the nuclear enterprise, government has become a partner in the nuclear field, developing through its contracts and subsidies a stake in the promotion of nuclear power. This partnership reduces the ability of government to exercise independent regulation and control. Regulatory agencies seeking to function in such a context are often attacked for their promotional philosophy, and the agencies responsible for regulating nuclear power are no exception. The 1974 amendments to the Atomic Energy Act reorganized the administrative structure responsible for regulation, with the explicit purpose of separating the functions of promotion and control. This legislation abolished the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and set up a separate Nuclear Regulatory Commission. However, much of the existing staff, with their industrial alliances, remained. A 1976 study of the NRC staff found that 65 percent of its 429 senior members had been employed in private energy enterprises holding NRC licenses, permits or contracts, and 73 percent of NRC consultants maintained simultaneous relationships with the agency and industries with NRC licenses or contracts (Kneier, 1976) . The NRC, claimed this study, is tied to the interests of the industry to the extent that it cannot effectively guide a cautious and safe development of nuclear technology.
According to a study by the General Accounting Office (1980) as well as an analysis commissioned by the NRC itself (Rogovin, 1980) , the agency has changed more in its title than in its essence. It has retained the AEC mentality, just as it has retained it staff and most of its procedures. Like the AEC, the NRC has been mainly concerned with expediting the development of nuclear power. It did not "burden" the industry with requirements to "backfit" older plants and bring them up to current safety standards. It downgraded penalties and enforcement sanctions. It failed to respond to questions of safety raised by some individuals within the agency. Nor did it engage in comprehensive evaluations of past operating experiences or systematically review the series of minor accidents that have plagued the development of nuclear technology. Focusing on licensing rather than generic problems, the NRC failed to establish adequate mechanisms to monitor safety-related problems, relying rather on licensees to detect and correct deficiencies without independent commission verification. As the Kemeny Commission reviewed the history of the NRC, it found it "erring on the side of industry's convenience rather than carrying out its primary mission of assuring safety" (President's Commission, 1979).
The complexity of nuclear technology and its broad-ranging impacts on the social environment create further problems of regulation. Organized to deal with specific industrial activities, regulatory agencies are unsuited to cope with systemic problems. As a result of the accident and subsequent criticism of the NRC, its staff grew by 14 percent from 2,841 to 3,240 in one year, and its annual budget increased from $325.8 million to $423 million. Requirements were developed for additional training of reactor operators. Emergency plans include telephone hotlines to a commission emergency response center. The inspection system was improved and the structure of the commission itself reevaluated. But "improved" regulation will inevitably increase operating costs and it may also exacerbate the problems of complexity, compounding the difficulties of management and the risk of systemic effects. Mile Island accident had just such effects. Hundreds of scientists from the NRC and other federal and state agencies, and utilities, and the industry, descended on Three Mile Island. In addition, "critical scientists" representing the nuclear opposition entered the debate. For example, a consulting firm had been formed by three General Electric nuclear engineers who had resigned from the company in 1976 in protest against what they felt was inadequate attention to nuclear safety and insoluble problems of human error associated with nuclear power. These scientists work for the anti-nuclear movement and were the technical consultants for the movie, The China Syndrome, released just prior to the accident and coincidentally portraying a very similar accident.
As these scientists assessed the problem, its dimensions and its causes were as varied as their interests and their concerns about the future of nuclear policy. The genuine technical uncertainty involved in evaluating risk allowed them a very wide range of interpretation. With a few standards to guide evaluation, scientists could easily make different judgments about the seriousness of health and environmental risks. Predictably, these judgments corresponded to these scientists' prior attitudes towards nuclear power (Nelkin, 1980) . Scientists at Three Mile Island were far more than simply investigators seeking the causes and dimensions of the accident. They served as publicists, image makers, as sources of credible information, as contacts for the persistent and everpresent press. They served to "represent" the views of both pro-and anti-nuclear groups, all with intense concerns about the future of nuclear power. Their public disputes in this and indeed in other controversies, creates a striking paradox. While inevitably undermining the credibility of scientific expertise as an objective basis for policy, public conflict has vastly expanded the expert's policy role. Special studies, commissions, and review boards have proliferated. Over $10 million was spent on official Three Mile Island inquiries, and hundreds of contracts for research on the causes and impacts of the accident were awarded.
The scientists' expanding influence following the Three Mile Island accident suggests the heavy dependence on the judgment of an expert elite whenever problems of technological risk arise. For power tends to gravitate towards those who can manage the critical information. As problems of risk assume increased policy importance, this tendency to augment the power of expertise raises serious questions about political legitimacy, exacerbating existing tensions over democratic control of technology and deepening public distrust (Kasperson, 1979) . The Media. The accident also had important implications for the media. The nuclear debate has increasingly engaged the press since the 1970s. Print media coverage of nuclear power increased by 400 percent between 1972 and 1976 (Rubin, 1979) . But at Three Mile Island, the complex technical character of the events and the factual uncertainty among experts and regulatory officials came into conflict with enormous pressures for immediate reporting, to create a hopelessly confused situation. The public's right to information and the problems of communicating information about technology became the focus of a subsequent investigation.
The task force from the Kemeny Commission assessed these problems and reviewed the ability of the media to present timely, accurate and understandable information about the rapidly changing situation (Rubin, 1979) . It found a number of basic problems. At least 500 journalists came to Three Mile Island. At first there existed no central information facilities, and no one to answer basic technical questions. The NRC also lacked the organization to deal effectively with public relations during the crisis. The utility was cautious and lacking in candor. With its reputation on the line, Metropolitan Edison "showed a marked capacity for self-deception [or] it hid behind technical jargon to obscure answers to troublesome questions" (Rubin, 1979, p. 9). Eventually the utility delegated the communication of official technical data to the NRC and avoided public interaction. However, it hired a team of public relations experts to present its views to the community.
Many reporters were poorly informed about rudimentary details of nuclear power, and this problem was compounded by the obfuscation caused by the technical language in which details were presented. Even those scientists who were willing to openly discuss the problems with reporters often had difficulties explaining themselves in non-technical terms. The problem, claimed the Kemeny Commission task force, was less the sensationalism of the press than the nature of the information actually provided to journalists-information often misleading and distorted by deliberate cover-ups and suppression of facts-as well as by genuine technical uncertainty.
In this context, press coverage was often confused, inaccurate, and indeed, as a consequence of inadequate information, sensationalist. The experience created an awareness of the importance of accurate communication-the need for journalists to develop some knowledge about nuclear technology, and especially for the nuclear establishment to provide a more candid and prompt response to demands for news.
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Conclusions
Proponents and critics of nuclear power clearly view the risks of this technology through very different lenses. To those convinced of the importance of the nuclear program, the fact that the accident fell short of a meltdown demonstrated that the reactor safety systems basically worked, and that the public need only be reassured of their reliability. To critics, the accident revealed the potentially catastrophic risks of nuclear technology, but it also indicated serious political, psychological, and institutional ramifications that are neither easily measured nor resolved. As economic priorities and energy problems create powerful pressures for technological advancement, these less immediate and often vague social impacts of technology have tended to be dismissed.
I have used the Three Mile Island accident as an example through which to suggest a series of major institutional and policy issues surrounding complex technologies. The very scale of technological commitments; their complexity and the nature of their risks, generate their own institutional reality-a reality that calls for social science research. The area of regulation of technology is the most obvious link between technology and social science. Indeed, the problem of the NRC as both a promoter and regulator of nuclear power are familiar in the context of regulatory politics. But special problems arise when the stakes are very high. What kind of structures can be organized to enhance the accountability of this regulatory system, and the controllability of the nuclear industry with its monopoly of expertise? How does this industry deal with risk and the increasing pressure for greater public accountability?
The rapid increase in litigation as a means to force accountability presents a number of other problems suggested by the aftermath of Three Mile Island. The courts are poorly equipped to deal with the esoteric and uncertain scientific information that confounds the nuclear debate. Judges are accustomed to ruling on precedent, not on statistical assessments of potential risks. And they are not trained to evaluate the highly technical arguments that are increasingly involved in recent techno-political disputes. Moreover, many technologies raise problems that require reanalysis of legal principles: what is the appropriate role of law in assessing long-term effects of an accident such as Three Mile Island? How can courts be expected to have the competence to deal with technical issues? And how can they deal with questions of fairness when technological developments justified by the "public interest" infringe on local community interests? Who is liable for major accidents? Who is responsible for the longterm social costs that may be incurred?
The psychological stress observed in the Harrisburg region suggests a number of questions about the sociology of risk perception. What social processes are involved in the perception of risk by different groups? What are the discrepancies between perception and reality? How are these perceptions influenced by factors such as the availability of choice, the credibility of responsible institutions or the prevailing state of technical uncertainty?
Disputes among scientists not only affect public policy, but the very institution of science as well. What is the effect of such disputes on the scientific community and its traditional image of neutrality? On the role of science as a legitimating institution? What is the impact of technical uncertainty on the possibilities of public participation? On the credibility of policy-making institutions?
Finally, in the age of media politics, the role of the press looms large. Who speaks for government in communicating with the media? How can journalists develop the competence to deal accurately with events such as the Three Mile Island accident?
These are but a few of the many questions that have emerged from a social analysis of the Three Mile Island accident. It must be emphasized that social research on this event was an afterthought -the results of efforts by a small group of people who decided to collaborate in calling attention to the sociological ramifications of this event (Wolf, 1979). Eventually, however, the Kemeny Commission discovered that the accident was indeed a "people problem" that derived from the predispositions, the "mind sets," the myths of rationality and control held by key participants who tended consistently to dismiss the importance of human factors in managing nuclear technology:
The Commission's attention slowly but steadily shifted almost completely from equipment to people. And we found that this was one of the most horrendous "people problems" we had ever encountered (Kemeny, 1980, p. 81) .
Eventually, too, the problem was conceived less as a technical than a social system failure that derived in part from the nature of social relationships among the leading actors in the nuclear enterprise (Sills, 1980) . In this sense, the Three Mile Island accident revealed with striking clarity that technology is a social concept to be understood in terms of social and political relationships if it is to be brought under public control.
